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 Financing SMEs: a Model for Optimising the Capital Structure 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper argues that the existing finance literature is inadequate with respect to its cov-
erage of capital structure of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). In particular it 
is argued that the cost of equity (being both conceptually ill defined and empirically non 
quantifiable) is not applicable to the capital structure decisions for a large proportion of 
SMEs and the optimal capital structure depends only on the mix of short and long term 
debt. The paper then presents a model for optimising the debt mix and demonstrates its 
practical application using an Italian firm’s debt structure as a case study. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is possible to distinguish two separate strands in the literature on firms’ capital struc-
ture. On the one hand, there is the research rooted in Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) 
model, which is based on the assumption of perfect markets. This stream of research fo-
cuses mainly on modelling theoretically the capital structure decision of large corpora-
tions. On the other hand, there is the empirical research on capital structure of SMEs and 
on SMEs lending relationships. This research tends to consider the owner and the man-
ager of the firm as one actor and is mainly concerned with investigating how external ac-
tors (banks, trade creditors, etc.) deal with the information asymmetries resulting from 
the opaqueness of SMEs. Although SMEs can rely on various sources of finance such as 
trade credit (see for instance Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 2006), research stresses the core role 
played by bank finance. 
Focusing on the SMEs financial structure, the present paper emphasises the importance 
of debt structure (that is long-term versus short-term debt) in financing SMEs and the mi-
nor role played by equity, presenting a model which is based on bank debt. In fact, we 
argue that SMEs should focus only on bank debt, in order to optimise their capital struc-
ture. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature on 
capital structure in general and in particular on what affects capital structure decisions in 
SMEs. Section 3 presents the arguments that equity is inapplicable for many SMEs’ capi-
tal structure decisions and that profit is not a sufficient source of finance for SMEs. In 
addition, the peculiar role of trade credit as a source of finance is investigated. These ar-
guments emphasise the extremely important role of bank debt. Section 4 presents the 
mathematical model for determining the long-term/short-term debt mix and two examples 
(one real life and one theoretical) are provided. Section 5 discusses how the optimum 
debt mix also benefits the lender (the bank) as well as the firm. Section 6 draws conclu-
sions and suggests some future research directions. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The most commonly used term in the literature to describe the capital structure of firms is 
“puzzle”. It recurs in various titles of academic papers and describes effectively the prob-
lem of finding the optimal structure in financing firms and projects. The foundation of the 
finance literature considers theoretically the modelling of the optimal capital structure for 
corporations and is based on Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) seminal work. Later re-
search investigates the role of taxes (Boyce and Kalotay, 1979; Brick and Ravid, 1985), 
the impact of refinancing costs (Jun and Jen, 2003) and the probability of going bankrupt 
(Philosophov and Philosophov, 2005). Further research addresses the agency costs (Jen-
sen and Meckling, 1976) and the moral hazard risk (Myers, 1977). The role of the cost of 
financing the firm is the key factor in pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Some scholars focus on the debt structure as a signalling device where short-term debt 
signals the high quality of the assets (Flannery 1986). The greater flexibility of short-term 
debt is also stressed (Sharpe, 1991). 
The main problem with the above mentioned research and models is that they are devel-
oped by looking at organisations which can easily access equity, that is large corpora-
tions. What about organisations that are constrained in accessing finance? This is the 
typical situation faced by SMEs. In fact, what characterises SMEs, is the limited access to 
equity which arises from a number of factors. Holmes and Kent (1991), by proposing a 
restricted version of pecking order theory to explain SMEs capital structure, argue that 
SMEs do not have easy access to equity; it is expensive and raising it implies a dilution 
of control of the firm. Lopez-Garcia and Sogorb-Mira (2008) by looking at Spanish 
SMEs find empirical support for pecking order theory and for the traditional trade off 
model (Kraus and Lintzberger, 1973), as well.  
An additional factor which affects SMEs capital structure, is linked to the control of the 
firm: family are very much concerned with not losing control of the firm, in order to pass 
it on to the next generation of the family. Thus, such firms tend to rely more on internal 
financing (Lopez-Garcia and Sanchez-Adujar, 2007). Moreover, Romano et al. (2000) as 
well as Chittenden et al. (1996) suggest that a complex mix of social, family, cultural and 
financial factors influence capital structure while Kotey (1999) stresses the entrepreneu-
rial attitudes to risk and debt.  
Yet another area of the finance literature on SMEs suggests that some of the factors in-
fluencing capital structure are industry specific (Hall, et al., 2004) and country specific 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999): it is shaped by the financial market characteris-
tics, the effectiveness of the legal system and the magnitude of government subsidies. In 
contrast, Psillaki and Deskalakis (2009) find that an SME’s capital structure is more in-
fluenced by firms’ characteristics than by the country.  
Some research focuses particularly on SMEs’ special features. Indeed, SMEs are (at least 
partially) hampered since raising finance in regulated markets is subject to constraints for 
small opaque firms that suffer from big information asymmetries (Berger, et al., 2001) 
and is impossible for the very small ones. Only as firms become older, larger and more 
informationally transparent, do their financial options become more attractive, accessing 
public equity funding as well as public long-term debt (Gregory et al. 2005). Thus, SMEs 
tend to rely mainly on banks (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and on specific financing tools 
like leasing and factoring which facilitate them in accessing the finance they need (Beck 
and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006, Deloof et al. 2007).  
Heyman et al. (2007) suggest that maturity matching between debt and the life of assets 
plays an important role in deciding the length of the debt. Short-term debt is positively 
correlated with a firm’s growth opportunities (Garcia-Terul and Martinez-Solano, 2007): 
it is higher in stronger and more flexible firms, when there are big differences between 
short-term and long-term interest rates and when firms have more growth opportunities. 
Some research investigates specifically the role short-term debt has in SMEs. It is re-
garded as a good tool for the bank which can act rapidly to recoup the principal on the 
arrival of bad news (although with the limitations pointed out by Gupta et al., 2008). It is 
also considered a good financing tool by entrepreneurs: they are optimistic and tend to 
overestimate the success of their projects, either because they receive non-economic 
benefits or because they fail to evaluate correctly the probability of success. Either way, 
from the entrepreneur’s point of view, short-term debt is the best financing tool because it 
is perceived to be cheaper. Thus, both entrepreneur and bank prefer short-term debt 
(Landier and Thesmar, 2009).  
Partially in contrast with the literature discussed above, which stresses the key role of 
banks in financing SMES, Burke and Hanley (2002) observe that banking finance is ex-
pensive and SMEs are often credit constrained. The implication of these findings is that 
SMEs are expected to rely more on retained earnings. 
Recent empirical research on SMEs financing challenges the proposition that capital 
structure can be modelled by looking at agency theory, asymmetry of information, taxes, 
etc. In contrast with previous models, support was provided for the proposition that the 
determinants of short-term debt and long-term debt are different; for instance short-term 
debt is not affected by the trade off between tax benefits and bankruptcy costs. Long-term 
debt is affected by collateralisable assets but short-term debt is not (Pindalo, et al., 2006). 
This was found both for SMEs and for new ventures for which the access to finance is 
more limited than for traditional SMEs (Örtqvist et al., 2006). Indeed, since new ventures 
are very risky because they lack a track record and frequently have not already entered 
the production and selling stage, finding a substitute for equity is very hard, notwith-
standing the tax benefits linked with leveraging debt (Örtqvist et al., 2006). 
Thus, the literature on SMEs suggests that any kind of generalisation can be very prob-
lematic and that optimal capital structure is not easy to determine. 
 
 
3. Investigating the sources of finance for firms 
 
Firms in general and SMEs in particular have various sources of finance to support their 
activities that can be summed up as: 
a) equity and shareholders’ funds; 
b) trade credit; 
c) short term and long term bank debt. 
In order to develop a model to optimise the capital structure of firms, it is important to 
investigate the role each component has in an attempt to build up an optimal capital struc-
ture for SMEs. 
 
3.1 The Inapplicability of Equity to SMEs Financing Decisions 
 
In the finance literature, the optimal capital structure (i.e. debt-equity ratio) is defined as 
that which minimises the overall cost of financing the venture. From this perspective one 
needs both the cost of debt and equity. What about the role of equity in SMEs? 
The literature on SMEs tends to focus on debt but does not provide a definitive answer 
about the role of equity. We argue that there are irresolvable problems in defining and 
quantifying equity and cost of equity, which prevent application of the concept of cost of 
equity in optimising SMEs capital structure. The problems concern determining the value 
of equity, what constitutes equity in an SME, how entrepreneurs consider equity and, fi-
nally, what is the cost of equity. 
 
3.1.1 What is the Value of Equity in an SME? 
 
In a perfect world, the value of equity is determined by the capital market. The main 
problem with SMEs is that there is no market where equity (that is shares representing 
SME ownership) is exchanged and no value can be easily ascertained. Thus, we have to 
look for alternative ways. 
One alternative solution is to look at the financial statements. Originally, the primary role 
of the financial statements was that of stewardship; keeping track of what has been done 
with the financial resources entrusted to an enterprise’s managers. There was no sugges-
tion that the Balance Sheet ‘shareholders funds’ figure represented the economic value 
(the net present value of future cash flows) of the enterprise. In recent years however, the 
regulatory framework governing financial reporting has decreed that the primary role of 
financial statements should be to facilitate investor decisions, to enable efficient capital 
markets (IASB/FASB, 2006a). It is acknowledged that, ideally, investors would like to 
know the future cash flows attributable to the enterprise, but given the uncertainty associ-
ated with future cash flows, the shareholders’ equity figure provided by the financial 
statements is to act as a proxy. This primary objective has guided the development of ac-
counting standards prescribing the accounting treatment of the various items influencing 
profit measurement and asset valuation and hence the shareholders’ equity figure shown 
by the financial statements (IASB/FASB, 2006b). 
There are a number of serious limitations of financial statements in providing a meaning-
ful equity figure. Firstly, they are typically transactions based – i.e. based on historical 
cost rather than on market values. Even in the absence of general inflation, it is funda-
mental to the operation of a market economy that relative prices change in response to 
demand and supply conditions. Therefore, use of historical cost accounting will not re-
flect current asset values. Although the regulatory framework now requires that certain 
assets/liabilities be ‘marked to market’ (IASB 2009) rather than being valued at historical 
cost, these are assets that trade actively in markets such as common stocks and bonds – 
i.e. financial instruments. Financial instruments are typically a small proportion of assets 
for SMEs; of greater significance is the valuation of fixed assets. Companies have the op-
tion of using either historical cost or market value for fixed assets. Evidence provided by 
interviewing SME owners and managers suggests that the majority of SMEs use histori-
cal cost – not surprising given that market values can fluctuate wildly and may be diffi-
cult to obtain for some assets.  
In addition, firms typically have many assets and liabilities that do not appear on their 
balance sheets but have a major impact on future cash flows: loyal customers, superior 
management, motivated employees, access to distribution channels, patents and trade-
marks and so on. Many companies acknowledge their people to be the most valuable as-
set. Until accountants are able to measure such assets, the book values will remain a poor 
proxy of the value to shareholders. An important reason why accounting profit (increase 
in equity per the income statement) is not the same as economic value created is that the 
regulatory regime effectively requires that the creation of many intangible assets is not 
recognised – these must be treated as an expense in the Profit and Loss account. These 
include (home grown) brands, marketing expenditure, intellectual capital and much of 
research and development expenditure. Stringent conditions allow some development ex-
penditure to be capitalised, but the most common practice has been to treat development 
costs as an expense.  
In addition to the problem of the exclusion of important assets, assets used in conjunction 
with each other often have a higher value to the firm than the sum of the values of the in-
dividual assets. That is, there are ‘synergies’ that are also not reflected in the financial 
statements. Clearly, asset evaluation impacts on reported profits and hence on “share-
holders’ equity” as reported in the financial statements. 
An additional source of distortion in the reported profit figure is the use of historical cost 
accounting (as still used by the majority of SMEs). Even with relatively low inflation 
rates, Historical Cost Accounting (HCA) results in a number of significant problems: in-
flation of 2.5% per year results in a fall in the value of money of about 30% in 10 years. 
Where there is inflation, HCA has a number of weaknesses in terms of measuring profit 
(i.e. increase in equity as shown by the Balance Sheet).  
Depreciation is understated, as a charge based on the historical cost of an asset does not 
provide for an increased replacement cost. Profit will therefore be overstated: if the resul-
tant profit figure were to be paid as dividend to the owner/s there would be insufficient 
funds to replace fixed assets when necessary. 
Cost of sales is understated, as the cost of replacing the stock consumed will be greater 
than the amount charged to the Profit and Loss account as an expense for the period. 
Profit will therefore be overstated: if the resultant profit figure were to be paid as divi-
dend to the owner/s there would be insufficient funds to replace the stock and maintain 
the operating capacity of the firm. 
In most organizations, the value of debtors exceeds the value of creditors. With inflation, 
the real value of debtors (an asset) falls, as does the real value of creditors (a liability). 
Since the value of debtors usually exceeds the value of creditors, the fall in the value of 
assets exceeds the fall in the value of liabilities, implying a reduction in real profits. This 
however is not recognised with HCA. 
Borrowings (typically bank loans) are fixed in monetary terms and therefore fall in real 
terms with inflation, implying a gain by the company at the expense of the lender. Again, 
this is not reflected when HCA is used – as is usually the case with SMEs. 
As well as the above factors leading to a distortion in reported profits for an individual 
year, the decline in the value of money means that year on year figures are not compara-
ble. Yet the Balance Sheet figure for shareholders funds (equity) reflects the accumula-
tion of retained profits so measured – further contributing to a meaningless shareholders 
funds figure! 
In conclusion, therefore, although the financial statements may have their uses, providing 
a meaningful figure for equity, to enable the cost of equity to be determined, is not one of 
them. 
A third possibility for valuing the equity of SMEs is to adopt the approach taken by the 
tax authorities in a number of countries - including the UK. Such valuations are required 
when shares in unquoted companies change hands (for example due to death/inheritance) 
and a taxable benefit arises. This approach values the firm on an earnings basis, by refer-
ence to similar quoted firms. If, for example, the annual earnings are £500k and the Price- 
Earnings ratio of a similar quoted company is 10, then the initial valuation of the SME 
will be £5m. This figure is then adjusted to reflect the fact that an unquoted company is 
inherently less valuable than a similar quoted company. It cannot, for example, raise capi-
tal so easily and there are often restrictions on the transfer of shares. Consequently, the 
£5m starting value is adjusted downwards. 
Clearly, there are major limitations with this approach also. Firstly, there is the difficulty 
of finding a ‘similar’ quoted company, given the distinctive characteristics of most 
SMEs. Then there is the magnitude of the adjustment: should it be 10%, 25% or 50%? 
The figure is ultimately arbitrary and the resultant valuation is unlikely to produce an ac-
curate representation of the true value of equity.   
 
3.1.2 How Entrepreneurs View Equity 
 
SMEs are traditionally financed by the entrepreneurs and their relatives (for the role of 
family, see Fletcher, 2000). They do not like to access external finance since it implies a 
reduction in the freedom in managing the firm (Delmar, 2000), limitation in the possibil-
ity of accessing non-pecuniary benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the implementa-
tion of additional control and management tools (Delmar, 2000). SMEs are very opaque 
and for them the implementation of control mechanisms can be very costly. Therefore, 
potential investors face big problems in valuing the venture and making investment deci-
sions (Block and McMillan, 1985). In addition, SMEs are used to dealing with banks re-
quests rather than those of venture capitalists and business angels (Mason and Stark, 
2004). Consequently, entrepreneurs do not typically seek external funds in the form of 
equity. As a result, in the large majority of SMEs, the equity invested in the venture con-
sists entirely of the funds provided by the entrepreneurs. 
 
3.1.3 What Actually Constitutes Equity? 
 
SMEs typically have substantial debt financing but banks will require collateral that must 
be provided by the SMEs shareholders and associates. Therefore, the shareholders in-
vestment in the firm is not only the original cash provided plus any retained earnings, but 
also the personal assets provided as collateral to obtain bank funds. In other words, SMEs 
have hidden collateral that can play a very important role for the life of the business. In 
addition, when the firm is run as a sole trader or it does not rely on limited liability, it im-
plicitly leverages all entrepreneurs’ personal assets since in case of distress, creditors can 
access not only the firm’s assets but also the entrepreneurs’ private assets. Either way, 
shareholders and entrepreneurs usually invest in the venture all their wealth from the be-
ginning (Avery, et al. 1998). The logical conclusion is that it is difficult to determine the 
real value of the equity invested in a venture since hidden equity is not included in the 
notional figure. 
Thus, when the firm needs additional funds to expand, the original funders often are not 
able to provide additional equity to cover additional needs. SMEs are financially con-
strained in accessing additional equity and their only option is to obtain additional bank 
finance or leverage their trade credit capability (Berger and Udell, 1998, Howorth, 2001). 
The analysis provided above supports a conclusion: when SMEs need additional funds (in 
excess of annual earnings) to finance expansion, equity is typically not an option. There-
fore, in determining the optimal capital structure of the firm, equity is not a variable but a 
constant and has to be treated accordingly. 
 
3.1.4 The Entrepreneurs’ View of Return on Equity 
 
The cost of equity is an opportunity cost; the return providers of equity could earn else-
where, on investments of a similar risk. Movements in the share price over a period of 
time can be used to derive this expected return on equity (ROE) – i.e. the opportunity cost 
of equity – for a quoted company. For most SMEs however, the ROE (cost of equity) 
cannot be derived from the market value of the shares. 
In an ideal world, expected ROE could be derived from the firm’s financial statements; 
competitive markets would ensure that actual ROE converged on expected ROE and ac-
tual ROE would be provided by the financial statements. As we have already argued, 
these statements do not provide a meaningful figure for the value of equity and hence the 
cost of equity. 
Entrepreneurs and SME’s shareholders involved in the management of the firm either 
directly (as managers) or indirectly (as relatives and friends of the management), seem 
not to pay too much attention to the expected return on equity. Literature on entrepre-
neurship stresses their desire for independence (Delmar, 2000), optimism about the ven-
ture’s success (Landier and Thesmar, 2008) and the fact that the entrepreneurs enjoy non-
pecuniary benefits as high as 20% of their investment (Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgenssen, 2002). In fact, median entrepreneurial earnings after 10 years of business are 
found to be 35% less than the predicted alternative wage on a paid job of the same dura-
tion (Hamilton, 2000). From this perspective, the expected financial return on equity is 
not the key concern for entrepreneurs. This point is clearly supported by various inter-
views the researchers conducted with Italian entrepreneurs and SME managers and own-
ers. They have difficulties in understanding the concept of return on equity: when asked 
to provide a figure, they first ask for an explanation and then have difficulties in provid-
ing any figure. Moreover, they are often very inconsistent when the same question is 
asked at different points during the interview. 
 3.2 Profit 
 
Accounting profit being the change in equity, suffers from all the problems we have al-
ready listed above about equity. In addition, there are some factors that are profit specific. 
Pecking Order Theory (POT), as explained by Myers and Majluf (1984), stresses that 
profit is the first choice among the possible sources of finance, since it is the cheapest. It 
implicitly links profit to the cash available to the firm. Our point is that such an approach, 
even potentially correct in the long run, is not applicable in the short run. The problem is 
that profit is an accounting measure while when we discuss the sources of finance of the 
firm, we are interested in the cash availability to the firm. 
In fact, profit differs from cash as the differences between the income statement and the 
cash flow statement clearly show. 
Thus, profit cannot be considered the main source of finance. 
 
3.3 Trade Credit 
 
Trade credit is a further source of finance in addition to equity and debt. The overall 
amount of trade credit the firm can obtain is a matter of negotiation with the suppliers and 
is affected by the relative power (usually low) the SME has. The amount of trade credit is 
capped since it is linked to the amount of services/products the firm buys. In addition, it 
is strongly affected by the firm characteristics. If the firm runs the production internally 
and the cost of bought products and raw material is very low with respect to the overall 
costs the firm incurs (such as in small manufacturing firms), the role of trade credit is 
greatly reduced. On the contrary, if the firm outsources the production and/or the cost of 
raw material is very high with respect to the value of the sales (such as in the retailing 
sector), the firm can benefit from trade credit. In fact, firms traditionally make use of all 
the potential trade credit available to them. 
In addition, the firm is required to provide trade credit to customers. Since the value of 
sales is greater than the value of the purchases, the amount of credit provided to the cus-
tomers is usually greater than the amount of credit received from suppliers. As a conse-
quence, the firm is not necessarily better off by the use of trade credit. The firm can bene-
fit from trade credit if it is able to discount its receivables with the bank or with factoring 
organisation but at a cost. From this point of view, the firm is simply using a peculiar 
kind of bank credit. 
The cost of trade credit is not easy to establish, since firms are usually not charged differ-
ently according to the length of the period for which credit is taken. Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) define the cost of trade credit in terms of cash discount available by paying in ad-
vance rather than utilising the full period of credit available. Such an approach provides 
inconsistent figures and it does not work when cash discount is not an option, where no 
differences in price can be found between different terms of payment. Some other works 
define cost of trade credit as the discount rate on discounting receivables (Miwa and 
Ramseyer, 2008), stressing that trade credit is an example of delegated monitoring (Dia-
mond, 1984), where the bank exploits seller economies of scale in monitoring the buyer. 
Either way, the cost of trade credit is not relevant per se: either it is non-existent, or it is a 
component of the cost of bank funds (and therefore included in the cost of debt). 
 
3.4  Implications 
 
According to the foregoing arguments, for the large majority of SMEs, the cost of equity 
cannot be applied to capital structure decisions for a number of reasons: 
a) SMEs are usually not listed and no market value of equity can be ascertained; 
b) The book value of the equity is highly questionable and does not provide a real 
representation of the value of the shareholders’ investment; 
c) the real amount of equity is hard to determine since SMEs benefit from hidden 
capital in the form of guarantees provided by entrepreneurs; 
d) entrepreneurs do not attach importance to the return on equity since they benefit 
from many other pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits; 
e) equity is not a variable but a constant since: 
a. SMEs owners do not like to open the shareholding to new investors (ven-
ture capitalists, business angels, private equity funds, etc.); 
b. SMEs owners usually invest all their wealth in the venture from the begin-
ning and therefore when the firm needs additional finance they are not 
able to provide it. 
Equity and the return on equity cannot be quantified or even clearly defined for the ma-
jority of SMEs. The cost of equity cannot therefore be ascertained and employed in capi-
tal structure decisions. 
Also profit is not necessarily a source of finance. When, for example, the profit is the re-
sult of assets revaluation (as in mark to market accounting), profit does not generate any 
financial benefit. In addition, there is a time lag between earning profit and generating 
cash. 
Finally, trade credit provided by the supplier is costless or more precisely has a cost that 
is embedded in the value of the product/service that is purchased. Moreover, trade credit 
provided by suppliers can only partially cover firm’s needs since only a part of the firm’s 
overall costs (and overall cash outflows) relate to suppliers and can be leveraged in order 
to gain some credit. Finally, the possibility for the firm to leverage it is strongly linked to 
the power it has with respect the supplier. These arguments support the point that trade 
credit shares characteristics with equity: its amount can be considered as given for the 
firm since it can change only according to change in the overall amount of prod-
ucts/services bought. In other words, the firm leverages all the trade credit it can and then 
needs other sources of finance to cover its financial needs. 
According to the above reasoning, only the cost of debt is applicable to SMEs capital 
structure decisions. 
 
 
4. The Model 
 
The firm’s financial structure can be summed as follows: 
 
F = E + Rp + TC + STD + LTD 
 
Where F is the total finance the firm needs, E is equity provided by shareholders, Rp is 
retained profit owed to shareholders, TC is trade credit provided by suppliers and STD 
and LTD are respectively short- and long-term debt provided by banks. 
According to our arguments, E is either not quantifiable/definable or a constant and its 
cost cannot be determined; Rp is irrelevant since we are trying to optimise the capital 
structure of the firm for the short period (one year) and ambiguous (it is an accounting 
measure); and TC can be considered an exogenous variable. Thus, we need to focus only 
on short and long-term debt. 
The short-term debt is a flexible financial tool, which covers the financial needs left un-
covered by other forms of financing. It is expected to be a temporary source of finance. 
The habitual use of short-term debt means that the firm needs financing in excess of tem-
porary and occasional needs. In other words, when the firm uses short-term debt continu-
ously, it transforms de facto short-term debt to some kind of medium/long-term debt. 
Theoretically speaking, the steady use of short-term debt means that the firm is not 
matching correctly the life of the assets and the debt used to finance them. Such a mis-
match increases implicitly the firm’s financial risk (Heyman, Deloof and Ooghe, 2007). 
Matching assets and debt correctly reduces the risk premium banks charge the firm. In 
addition, when the debt is consolidated into one bank, the quality of information gained 
by the bank improves and the bank can pass some of the savings in the cost of monitoring 
activity on to the customers (Moro, 2007). 
The model we present here answers the question: what level of long-term debt 0≥D  is 
optimal in the sense that the total amount of interest paid is minimised on the short period 
(say one year). As input data, it uses the interest rates Lr  for long-term debt, Sr  for short-
term debt, and the reinvestment rate Rr  for interest earned on positive account balance. 
For the model to be operationalised, we need to assume that RLS rrr >> .  In fact, the in-
terest paid on short term deposit (i.e. what the bank pays to the provider of the funds) has 
to be smaller than the interest rate received by customers (who are using the funds) oth-
erwise the bank would get less than it pays. Empirical evidence suggests that firms pay 
higher interest rate on short-term debt than on long-term debt. There are different possi-
ble explanations: for instance, the long term debt is often collateralised and therefore the 
bank is hedged in case of default. In addition, banks tend to charge short-term debt with 
additional management fees (that in our model are included in short-term interest rate).  
If the account balance b  is known for every day in the year, the total interest paid over a 
year can be calculated by summing up the daily interest paid for the short-term debt 
Db +  (when this is negative), subtracting the interest earned on the amount Db +  (when 
this is positive), and adding the annual interest DrL  for the long-term debt. While this 
can be done retrospectively, the daily account balances will not be known precisely in 
advance, and it is sensible to specify the financial requirements of the SME by a distribu-
tion function 0)( ≥bC  for the account balance b , which could either be empirically de-
rived from actual data, or heuristically derived by making assumptions about the cash 
flow. The distribution function is normalised according to 
 
∫
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The cumulative distribution function is 
 
∫
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=
x
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which corresponds to the area to the left of x  as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – Normal distribution (with mean 0 and standard deviation 1) and corresponding 
cumulative distribution 
 
 
 
 
The distribution function )(bC  describes how often an account balance b  is available, in 
the sense that the integral over an interval 
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specifies what fraction of days of the year the account balance lies between 1b  and 2b , or, 
in other words, it gives the probability that on any given day the account balance lies 
within this range. In practice, there will be a minimum and maximum balance, so 
0)( =bC  outside a certain range of values, and the integral will reduce to a finite domain, 
but it might be useful to allow for an infinite range, for instance to be able to use a simple 
normal distribution (Gaussian distribution) as a model.  
The total interest I  paid over a year is a function of the long-term debt level 0≥D , 
which contributes DrL  to the annual interest. Due to the long-term consolidation, the ac-
count balance is now Db + , so short-term debt at rate Sr  is only needed if 0<+ Db  or, 
in other words, if Db −< . On the other hand, when Db −> , the account balance is posi-
tive, and the SME gains interest at rate Rr . The total interest payment per year is thus 
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The optimal choice for the long-term debt D  is the value that minimises this function. 
The derivative of )(DI  with respect to D  is 
 ∫∫
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where the two integrals are the areas under the distribution function )(bC  to the left and 
right of D− , representing the fraction of time the account balance is below and above 
D− , respectively. Using the cumulative distribution function CF , this expression simpli-
fies to 
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which can be written as 
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The minimum is obtained when this derivative is zero, hence the optimal value of  D  is 
determined by the condition 
 
RS
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This means that the optimal value of  D  has to be chosen such that the fraction of time 
the account balance falls below D−  equals the fraction of interest rates on the right-hand 
side of the equation above. 
In what follows, we illustrate this result by means of two examples. The first example 
assumes a normal distribution for )(bC , the second uses actual data which had been ana-
lysed previously in Moro et al. (2009). 
  
4.1 Example 1: Normal distribution 
 
Consider the case when )(bC  is a normal distribution as shown in Figure 1, but with 
mean B and standard deviation σ , so 
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The cumulative distribution function can be expressed in terms of the error function 
)erf(x  as follows 
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To be specific, let us choose some values for the parameters. For an average balance 
000,000,1−=B € and standard deviation 000,500=σ €, and interest rates %6=Sr , 
%5=Lr  and %1=Rr , we get 54)( =−DFC , which gives 
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The approximate value for the argument of the error function is 0.595115, which yields 
an optimum value for the long-term debt of 189,579=D €. The total interest paid calcu-
lates to 999,56)( =DI € as compared to 212,60)0( =I € which is the interest charged if 
only short-term debt is used. 
 
4.2 Example 2: Empirical distribution 
 
As our second example, we consider a company for which we have daily bank account 
data over a one year period (in fact 365 days). This example uses the data from an Italian 
SME and is based on the ContoCheck® model. ContoCheck® is a tool developed by an 
Italian financial consultancy firm, which attempts to improve the long-short term debt 
mix. The logic of ContoCheck® is very close to the model we presented above even 
though the approach is not mathematical. The daily bank balance is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 – Daily account balance 
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A suitable distribution function can be given as a histogram of the daily data, shown in 
Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3 – Histogram of daily data and the normal distribution with the same mean and 
standard deviation 
 
 
 
For the company in question, the average interest rate paid on overdraft was 4.72% and 
the average overdraft used around 50% of the available credit. With consolidation, the 
new interest rates that the firm was able to negotiate were 4.00% for the long-term loan, 
4.60% for the overdraft and 0.5% on the temporary deposits. On the bases of these inter-
ests rates, the optimum long-term debt is determined by 854.01.45.3)( ≅=−DFC , so we 
need to find the corresponding value of the cumulative distribution function. However, 
since we have daily data, it is in fact simple to give a good estimate – all we need to find 
is the value D− such that on 0.854 of the 365 days, i.e. on 312 days, the account balance 
was below D− , which can quickly be done by sorting the data. The corresponding value 
for D is 623,158€, which is very close to the value found in Moro et al. (2009) by locat-
ing the minimum of )(DI  by inspection, by looking at the graph presented in figure 3, 
based on use of the ContoCheck® tool.  
 
Figure 4 – Change in the cost of credit  
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 Alternatively, we can approximate the data by a normal distribution as shown in Figure 3. 
From the daily data, we obtain a mean of -865,958€, with a standard deviation of 
235,307€. Using the approach of Example 1, the condition for the optimum long-term 
debt D  is 
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The approximate value for the argument of the error function is 0.744056, which gives an 
optimum level of long-term debt of 618,355€, again in close agreement with the data ob-
tained above. In this example, the approximation by the normal distribution, which just 
requires the knowledge of the mean and standard deviation of the account balance (or a 
reasonable estimate of these), suffices to derive an optimal debt structure. 
 
4.3 The Debt Repayment Plan 
 
Having determined the overall amount of short-term debt to be consolidated into long-
term debt, the next step is to define the repayment plan. This has a key role in building up 
the optimal debt structure of the firm since: 
a) if it is too short, the firm will end up again using short-term debt to finance long 
term assets; 
b) if it is too long, it can raise problems of underinvestment since the firm has addi-
tional free cash temporarily available (Jensen, 1986). 
Thus, the repayment plan has to match the cash flows available after all current expendi-
ture (suppliers, personnel, taxes, etc.) and repayment of other long-term debt but before 
the payment of dividends.  
The model attempts to match the life of the firm’s assets and the debt maturity. The re-
payment plan matches the cash flows available after all current expenditure (suppliers, 
personnel, taxes, etc.) but before the payment of dividends. 
 
 
5. Impact on Banking Relationships 
 
Research on lending suggests that lending technologies can be grouped into four main 
categories: financial statement lending (based on the evaluation of information from the 
financial statements); asset based lending (based on the provision of collateral and its 
quality); credit score lending (based on statistical techniques); relationship lending (Ber-
ger & Udell, 2002). The first three lending technologies are usually defined as transaction 
lending because they are based on available factual and public information, independ-
ently of the quality of the relationship. They include loans that are mainly spot-like and 
for non recurring needs. Lenders can easily evaluate these loans using credit scoring and 
credit rating methods (Allen, DeLong & Saunders, 2004). Relationship lending is differ-
ent from transaction lending because it is based on recurring needs (such as lines of 
credit, overdrafts, etc.). The research on relationship lending suggests that improvements 
in the relationships between banks and small businesses improves credit availability, re-
duces the cost of credit and the need for the pledging of collateral. In reality, the different 
lending technologies are not mutually exclusive. In their review of lending technologies 
Berger and Udell (2006) point out that banks tend to use more than one technology at a 
time: relationship lending can be accompanied by the request for collateral as well as 
with the use of credit scoring systems. 
Focusing attention on building up the best short-term/long-term debt mix can help SMEs 
in improving the relationship with the banks. First of all, building up the optimum short-
term/long-term debt mix can reduce the adverse selection risk since the bank is provided 
with information about the use of the funds and has a clear idea about the capability of 
the firm to meet the interest and principal repayments. An additional benefit derives if the 
number of banks the firm is dealing with is reduced with the consolidation process (that 
is, when the firm decides to consolidate previous short-term debts in few/one banks). Re-
search provides support for the proposition that such a strategy helps in reducing infor-
mation asymmetry. 
Secondly, optimising the short-term/long-term debt mix provides the firm and the bank 
with a clearer representation of financial needs: the firm has a clear idea of its financing 
needs; the bank is provided with information of higher quality. In fact, research empha-
sises the fact that different funders are interested in different aspects of the firm. Banks 
are focused on the cash flows that the firm generates to repay its loans (Mason and Stark, 
2004). By looking at the debt mix and repayment plan for long-term debt in terms of cash 
flow generated by the firm, the firm offers the information the bank needs in order to 
evaluate the credit and to match debt maturity with the cash needed by the firm. 
All these factors reduce the risk the bank incurs. When the bank operates in a lending ef-
ficient market, the benefit is passed on to the customer because the bank charges a lower 
risk premium to the firm. Thus, the firm-bank relationship improves and both are better 
off (D’Auria et al., 1999). 
All in all, by optimising the short-term/long-term debt mix, not only are the SMEs better 
off as a result of the reduction in the cost of the funds, but also the relationship with the 
bank is improved. In other words, it is a win-win strategy where both SMEs and banks 
are better off. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have argued that the existing finance literature is incomplete with respect 
to the capital structure of SMEs. Its focus is on the debt equity – mix, which we have ar-
gued is inappropriate for SMEs. The cost of equity is not applicable to the majority of 
SMEs capital structure decisions. Equity, although theoretically definable as the net pre-
sent value of future net cash flows attributable to the owners, is not usually quantifiable: 
no market value is usually available and the financial statements provide a poor proxy. 
Although the accounting regulators are moving towards the investor decision making 
function of financial statements, the magnitude of the problem encountered makes it 
unlikely that these statements will provide a meaningful equity figure in the foreseeable 
future. Moreover, due to the hidden equity in the form of personal collateral provided by 
owners, such statements are further constrained in their ability to quantify equity. Many 
entrepreneurs, in addition to not knowing the value of their equity, are unable often to 
provide additional equity and unwilling to consider external new equity as a source of 
finance, as it dilutes ownership and control. Equity therefore, whatever its value, is a con-
stant not a variable in SMEs capital structure decisions. Drawing these issues together, 
the implication is that SMEs should not concern themselves with the concept of cost of 
equity and should focus instead on optimising the debt mix. We have presented a tool for 
optimising this mix and thereby minimising the cost of capital. The finance literature 
should incorporate this approach in specifying the capital structure for SMEs. The impli-
cation of our work is to provide support for the core proposition of the Modigliani Miller 
capital structure model, but from a different perspective: equity/debt mix is non applica-
ble to SMEs capital structure decisions; only the long term/short term debt mix is impor-
tant. 
The issues raised in this paper also have implications for a future research agenda. One 
area needing further consideration is the appropriateness of discounted cash flow tech-
niques for investment appraisal in SMEs, if the cost of equity (and hence the discount 
rate) cannot be quantified: is it correct to use only the cost of debt? Technically speaking 
it is not, since in this case we are dismissing one important component in the cost of 
funds. In addition, it implies a strong reduction in the weighted average cost of capital 
since the more expensive component of the cost (equity) is ignored. Possibly, the right 
answer is to develop different tools in order to evaluate projects when the cost of equity 
cannot be quantified. Another area worthy of further consideration is the role of trade 
credit. It can play different roles according to industry, firm operational structure, etc. In 
our model it is considered an exogenous variable since we suppose that firms use all the 
trade credit available and then use other sources of finance. Indeed, our model looks at 
optimising what we can define as “the residual needs” (that is what is not covered by the 
available equity and trade credit). Also, the amount of trade credit can change over time, 
particularly when the firm suffers from seasonality. 
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